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I remembered reading Sam Harris' argument that led from "is to ought" -- and when I tried to look it up online, I couldn't find it anymore. The link went to a broken page on Sam's website and was hard to find elsewhere. I'm reproducing it here because I think it is interesting and useful. Sam, if you don't want me posting this for some reason, let me know.
Getting from Is to Ought
by Sam Harris
FACT #1: There are behaviors, intentions, cultural practices, etc. which potentially lead to the worst possible misery for everyone. There are also behaviors, intentions, cultural practices, etc. which do not, and which, in fact, lead to states of wellbeing for many sentient creatures, to the degree that wellbeing is possible in this universe.
FACT #2: While it may often be difficult in practice, distinguishing between these two sets is possible in principle.
FACT #3: Our “values” are ways of thinking about this domain of possibilities. If we value liberty, privacy, benevolence, dignity, freedom of expression, honesty, good manners, the right to own property, etc.—we value these things only in so far as we judge them to be part of the second set of factors conducive to (someone’s) wellbeing.
FACT #4: Values, therefore, are (explicit or implicit) judgments about how the universe works and are themselves facts about our universe (i.e. states of the human brain). (Religious values, focusing on God’s will or the law of karma, are no exception: the reason to respect God’s will or the law of karma is to avoid the worst possible misery for many, most, or even all sentient beings).
FACT #5: It is possible to be confused or mistaken about how the universe works. It is, therefore, possible to have the wrong values (i.e. values which lead toward, rather than away from, the worst possible misery for everyone).
FACT #6: Given that the wellbeing of humans and animals must depend on states of the world and on states of their brains, and science represents our most systematic means of understanding these states, science can potentially help us avoid the worst possible misery for everyone.
FACT #7: In so far as our subsidiary values can be in conflict—e.g. individual rights vs. collective security; the right to privacy vs. freedom of expression—it may be possible to decide which priorities will most fully avoid the worst possible misery for many, most, or even all sentient beings. Science, therefore, can in principle (if not always in practice) determine and prioritize our subsidiary values (e.g. should we value “honor”? If so, when and how much?).
FACT #8: One cannot reasonably ask, “But why is the worst possible misery for everyone bad?”—for if the worst possible misery for everyone isn’t bad, the word “bad” has no meaning. (This would be like asking, “But why is a perfect circle round?” The question can be posed, but it expresses only confusion, not an intelligible basis for skeptical doubt.) Likewise, one cannot ask, “But why ought we avoid the worst possible misery for everyone?”—for if the term “ought” has any application at all, it is in urging us away from the worst possible misery for everyone.
FACT #9: One can, therefore, derive “ought” from “is”: for if there is a behavior, intention, cultural practice, etc. that seems likely to produce the worst possible misery for everyone, one ought not adopt it. (All lesser ethical concerns and obligations follow from this).
Excellent.
"for if the term “ought” has any application at all, it is in urging us away from the worst possible misery for everyone."
Not true at all. Christians could say that "ought" means serving god. Kant would say that "ought" means following the categorical imperative.
The same goes for "bad".
I think this argument can be resumed like this:
1 Science can tell us which actions take us away from the worst possible misery for everyone.
2 We ought to avoid actions that take us away form the worst possible misery for everyone.
3 Therefore, science can tell us which actions we ought to avoid.
I don't see how this solves the is-ought problem at all.
I have a feeling that Harris would ask that the Christian in your case: "What if serving God completely led to the worst possible suffering for all conscious creatures -- and serving God slightly less would guarantee would ensure a heaven-like existence for all conscious creatures? Wouldn't it be moral to give up just the slightest bit of serving God to alleviate the suffering of all conscious creatures? To essentially transform all of creation from an existence in hell to an existence in heaven?
They can answer two ways:
A) It's moral to give up a little serving for entrance to heaven for all of creation
B) It's not moral to give up even a little bit of "serving God" to save all of creation from hell
If A -- then you agree that suffering/wellbeing is a more fundamental basis than "serving God"
If B -- we can ignore you.
I think Harris would argue to Kant that what motivates the intuition that the categorical imperative is a useful or correct way of determining morals and ethics comes from it's consequences -- specifically suffering/wellbeing.
As for your restatement of Harris' argument:
I think you meant "2" to say the opposite of what you wrote, but making that switch -- he'd agree that avoiding the worst possible misery for everyone is by definition what the moral action would be.
Sam's is an interesting argument, and it seems to sweep the problem "is/ought" into the definition of morality -- which he justifies by appealing to the fact that for the word to have meaning we have to agree that all possible states of the universe are not equivalently desirable (in the broadest possible sense of the word).
The is-ought fallacy is a real fallacy, and is why knowledge is justified, true belief. In order to be knowledge, a belief must both be justified by the evidence, and true by correspondence. If we consider justified a belief that only corresponds, we commit the is-ought fallacy. If we consider a belief true merely due to evidence in favor of it, we commit the ought-is fallacy. Related to moral truth--if a justified (answering the question of Ethics--"How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?") moral standard doesn't describe anything in reality, to consider it "true" commits the ought-is fallacy. If we take something from reality and call it moral truth, neglecting to consider whether it is justified (answering the question of Ethics), we commit the is-ought fallacy. In order for there to be moral truth, it must both correspond to a real being, and it must be justified (answering the question of Ethics). Its correspondence is not its justification (is=/=ought), and its justification is not its correspondence (ought=/=is).
Thanks for posting this. It doesn't seem like Harris makes any argument for why we ought to be concerned about the well-being of all conscious creatures. He just claims that anyone who disagrees with him is not worth taking seriously. Maybe the main, though not the only, problem with his argument is that we can imagine worse case scenarios. I am not convinced that a universe in which suffering is maximized is the worst-possible universe. I propose an alternative worst-case scenario here: Worst-Case Scenario?
By the way, is Harris' claim that values are facts really based on the claims that (1) values are about particular facts about the universe, and (2) values are states of the brain?
I think an intuitive argument could be made to support something like (1), but (2) is surely contentious. I'm not saying values might be states of something else, like a soul or something. Rather, values might not be states at all. That may be the wrong way of thinking about them. We might say that values are dispositional and, while they epen upon brain states, they are manifest in human behavior, and not just neurology. In any case, the fact that values can be understood in physical/behavioral terms does not make them facts--at least, not in any sense which would cause problems for the is/ought distinction. So Harris seems quite confused.
I've spent some time considering your argument. He's not necessarily saying that we ought to be concerned about the well-being of all conscious creatures -- he's saying that that's what the study of morality concerns itself with.
Also, you have an interesting Worst-Case Scenario where some creatures get pleasure from the absolute suffering of the remaining conscious creatures in the universe. I think Harris would split the difference with you and say, "Will you at least admit that the absolute worst suffering for all conscious creatures is bad and cannot be confused with good?"
I think the rest of his argument plays out fine as long as you have a starting point that's unequivocally bad. Thanks for commenting, you gave me a lot to think about, sorry for taking to long to respond. I'm going to cross-post my comment.
I think my criticism is more damaging to Harris' argument than you acknowledge. He defines "the wrong values" as "values which lead toward, rather than away from, the worst possible misery for everyone." He says this is necessary, or else "ought" has no meaning at all. That is the foundation he wants to establish for his scientific morality. It's not enough to just have something everybody agrees is bad: Harris needs to establish a method for analysing all moral conflicts. We could all agree that torturing and killing small children in front of their parents is bad. That does not establish a scientific basis for making moral judgments.
Also, he does not define "everyone" to mean "every homo sapiens sapiens." I haven't read his new book, but I read "The End Of Faith," so I wouldn't be surprised if his new book advances a Buddhist view of compassion and consciousness. I don't expect he wants to draw any lines between conscious beings which deserve compassion and those which do not; and so I expect that, for him, "the worst possible misery for everyone" means "the worst possible misery for all conscious beings." In fact, if I recall correctly, that is how he words it in his The Great Debate presentation.
*depend upon brain states
I've posted a lengthier reply to Harris' "facts":
link
Feedback would be greatly appreciated. And thanks again for posting this.